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**MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT  
LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY**

RIKKI HELD, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA, et al.,

Defendant.

Cause No. CDV-2020-307

**ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'  
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR  
MOOTNESS AND FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

**BACKGROUND**

The relevant background of this case is sufficiently described in the Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss at 1-5, apart from four new developments: (1) the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on August 4, 2021; (2) on March 16, 2023, the Governor signed HB 170 which repealed the State Energy Policy, Mont. Code Ann. § 90-4-1001; (3) District Court Judge Michael Moses held in *MEIC v. DEQ* that the State has been misinterpreting the MEPA Limitation and is, in fact, required to consider how greenhouse gas

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1 (GHG) emissions will affect Montana’s environment, DV-56-2021-0001307  
2 (13<sup>th</sup> District, April 6, 2023) (Order on Summary Judgment) at 29:3-9; and (4) in  
3 response to Judge Moses’ ruling, the Legislature expeditiously passed HB 971,  
4 which amended the MEPA Limitation to explicitly prohibit the State from  
5 considering greenhouse gases in MEPA decisions. HB 971 was signed into law  
6 by the Governor on May 10, 2023. The repeal of the State Energy Policy led to  
7 the State’s Motion to Partially Dismiss for Mootness, filed April 3, 2023, which  
8 will be discussed before moving to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,  
9 filed Feb. 1, 2023. Defendants’ previously filed a motion to stay the proceedings  
10 but withdrew that motion at oral argument held on May 12, 2023.

11 **1. Mootness/Redressability and Prudential Standing Issues**

12 The State<sup>1</sup> argues that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the State Energy  
13 Policy is moot due to the repeal of that statute on March 16, 2023. Defs.’ Br.  
14 Supp. Mootness at 2 (citing *Wilkie v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.*,  
15 2021 MT 221, ¶ 7, 494 P.3d 892 (quoting *Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v.*  
16 *Stuivenga*, 2012 MT 75, ¶ 16, 276 P.3d 867); *Greater Missoula Area Fed’n of*  
17 *Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start Inc.*, 2009 MT 362, ¶ 22,  
18 219 P.3d 881.

19 Plaintiffs argue that “the State has failed to establish that they no  
20 longer have a state energy policy, or that they have ceased systematically  
21 authorizing, permitting, encouraging, and facilitating activities promoting fossil  
22 fuels and resulting in dangerous GHG emissions.” Pls.’ Br. Opp. Mootness at 16.

23 Plaintiffs also argue that the voluntary cessation and public interest  
24 exceptions apply. Pls.’ Br. Opp. Mootness at 14 (citing *A.J.B. v. Mont.*  
25 *Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., Gallatin Cnty.*, 2023 MT 7, ¶ 14, 523 P.3d 519 (citing

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<sup>1</sup> For simplicity, the Court will refer to Defendants as “the State” or “State” throughout the remainder of the opinion.  
Order on Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss for Mootness  
and for Summary Judgment – page 2  
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1 *In re Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC*, 2022 MT 67, ¶ 15, 507 P.3d 169)).  
2 *See also Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre*, 2006 MT 215, ¶¶ 38-39,  
3 142 P.3d 864 (citing *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),*  
4 *Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)); *Ramon v. Short*, 2020 MT 69, ¶¶ 21-26.  
5 460 P.3d 867.

6 The Court will not analyze mootness per se because, after the  
7 repeal of Mont. Code Ann § 90-4-1001, other redressability and prudential issues  
8 are dispositive. In the Order on Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that declaring  
9 “these statutory provisions unconstitutional” would partially redress Plaintiffs’  
10 claimed injuries. Order on MTD at 18-19. Plaintiffs cite *Columbia Falls Elem. v.*  
11 *State* to support their contention that the Court can declare a *de facto* policy and  
12 the “aggregate acts” unconstitutional, but that suit challenged a legislative act.  
13 Pls.’ Br. Opp. Mootness at 13; *But see* 2005 MT 69, ¶¶ 23-25, 109 P.3d 257. In  
14 this sense, the State’s reading of *Donaldson* is correct: “the broad injunction and  
15 declaration not specifically directed at any particular statute would lead to  
16 confusion and further litigation.” Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. MSJ at 11 (citing  
17 *Donaldson*, 2012 MT 288, ¶ 9, 292 P.3d 364).

18 Plaintiffs’ contention that a ruling from this Court on the  
19 constitutionality of the State’s “longstanding and ongoing course of conduct . . .  
20 would change the legal status of such conduct and would steer Defendants’ future  
21 conduct into constitutional compliance” is not persuasive. Pls.’ Br. Opp.  
22 Mootness at 13. Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs pled the aggregate acts as  
23 an unconstitutional course of conduct, Compl. at 38, the relief contemplated by  
24 the Court has always been limited to declaratory judgment on the  
25 constitutionality of the “statutory provisions” and an injunction on the

1 enforcement of those provisions. Order on MTD at 18-19; Order on Second Rule  
2 60 Clarification at 7:10-12.

3 Plaintiffs' claims involving the *de facto* State Energy Policy are  
4 **DISMISSED** without prejudice for redressability and prudential standing issues.

5 **2. Summary Judgment**

6 Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the  
7 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is  
8 no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to  
9 a judgment as a matter of law." *State v. Avista Corp.*, 2023 MT 6, ¶ 11,  
10 411 Mont. 192, 523 P.3d 44 (quoting Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)). "To determine  
11 whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, [courts] view all evidence and  
12 draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving  
13 party." *Brishka v. State*, 2021 MT 129, ¶ 9, 487 P.3d 771 (citing *McLeod v. State*  
14 *ex rel. Dep't. of Transp.*, 2009 MT 130, ¶ 12, 206 P.3d 956). The initial burden is  
15 on the movant to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact,  
16 and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Id.* If the movant  
17 satisfies this burden, it shifts to the nonmovant "to prove, by more than mere  
18 denial or speculation, that a genuine issue does exist." *Id.* (citing *Valley Bank v.*  
19 *Hughes*, 2006 MT 285, ¶ 14, 147 P.3d 185). "On summary judgment, trial courts  
20 do not apply a standard of proof or issue findings of fact," and "need not weigh  
21 evidence, choose one disputed fact over another, or assess the credibility of the  
22 witnesses." *Barrett, Inc. v. City of Red Lodge*, 2020 MT 26, ¶ 8, 457 P.3d 233.

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1 fact, that my health is being damaged in order to find some relief, then we've lost  
2 the battle." *Id.* ¶ 74 (citing Convention Transcripts, Vol. V at 1243-44, March 1,  
3 1972).

4 **a. Distinguishable Injuries**

5 The Court ruled that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged "significant and  
6 physical manifestations of an infringement of their constitutional right to a clean  
7 and healthful environment." Order on MTD at 14:19-22 (citing *MEIC I* ¶ 77).  
8 Plaintiffs set forth specific facts to support their allegations. Compl. ¶¶ 14-81;  
9 Pls.' Br. Opp. MSJ at 2-3 n. 5-11.

10 The State's position that Plaintiffs' alleged injuries are "inaccurate,  
11 mischaracterized, or not otherwise demonstrating standing" only emphasizes the  
12 factual dispute over these injuries. Defs.' Br. Supp. MSJ at 4. It is not  
13 appropriate to weigh conflicting evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses at  
14 summary judgment; those duties are for the fact finder at trial. *Barrett, Inc.* ¶ 8.

15 The State asserts that Plaintiffs' claims are not "distinguishable  
16 from the injury to the public generally." Defs.' Br. Supp. MSJ at 4 (quoting  
17 *MEIC I* ¶ 41). However, "to deny standing to persons who are in fact injured  
18 simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious  
19 and widespread government actions could be questioned by nobody." *Helena*  
20 *Parents Comm'n v. Lewis & Clark Cnty. Comm'rs*, 277 Mont. 367, 374,  
21 922 P.2d 1140 (1996) (quoting *US v. SCRAP*, 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S. Ct. 2405  
22 (1973); see also *Sierra Club v. Morton*, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("the fact that  
23 particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few  
24 does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial  
25 process").

1           The State points to *Mitchell v. Glacier Cnty.* for the proposition  
2 that Plaintiffs’ may not merely allege they “suffer[] in some indefinite way in  
3 common with people generally.” 2017 MT 258, ¶ 10, 406 P.3d 427; Defs.’ Br.  
4 Supp. MSJ at 4. But that case was not about distinguishable injuries. *Id.* ¶ 36  
5 (citing *Helena Parents Comm’n* at 372-74) (“This case differs significantly from  
6 *Helena Parents Comm’n*. First, the contested issue—and the focus of our analysis  
7 in that case—was on the second requirement for standing: whether the alleged  
8 injury was distinguishable from the injury to the public generally.”)

9           Unlike *Mitchell*, *Helena Parents Comm’n* is instructive. In that  
10 case, plaintiffs were able to establish a kind of taxpayer standing by showing that  
11 the government would “impose tax burdens on them as it seeks to recoup losses  
12 and that the investments will result in a lessening of governmental services.”  
13 277 Mont. at 372. The Court went on to determine whether the taxpayers’ injury  
14 was distinguishable from the public generally. It held the district court “failed to  
15 consider that ‘the injury need not be exclusive to the complaining party,’ and  
16 failed to consider *Lee v. State*.” *Id.* (quoting *Sanders v. Yellowstone County*,  
17 53 Mont. St. Rep. 305, 306, 915 P.2d 196 (1996) (internal citation omitted))  
18 (citing *Lee v. State*, 195 Mont. 1, 635 P.2d 1282 (1981)).

19           In *Lee*, which involved a constitutional challenge to a statewide  
20 55 mile-per-hour speed limit, the State claimed that the plaintiff lacked standing  
21 because all members of the driving public had an affected interest in the statute  
22 and attempted to dismiss the case. The Court found *Lee* had standing based on  
23 the threat of prosecution, stating: “[t]he acts of the legislature which directly

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1 concern large segments of the public, or all the public, are not thereby insulated  
2 from judicial attack. Otherwise, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act would  
3 become largely useless.” *Lee*, 195 Mont. at 7.

4 Fifteen years later, in *Helena Parents Comm’n*, the Court  
5 elaborated on *Lee*’s reasoning: “[n]ot everyone who claims they will be injured  
6 claims to have been injured in the same way, and while each plaintiff claims a  
7 form of harm in common with other members of a larger class of people, the  
8 harm each claims is not common to all members of the general public.”  
9 277 Mont. at 373-74.

10 It is true, as the State argues, that climate change is a global  
11 problem and affects everyone. Had Plaintiffs merely alleged climate change was  
12 the injury, the State’s rule from *Mitchell* would apply. 2017 MT 258, ¶ 10. Here,  
13 Plaintiffs’ have set forth specific facts that show their claimed injuries are  
14 concrete, particularized, and distinguishable from the public generally. Pls.’ Br.  
15 Opp. MSJ at 2-3 n. 4-12; Compl. ¶¶ 14-81. The fact that many other Montanans  
16 are likely experiencing similar injuries is not dispositive.

17 **b. Traceability and Redressability**

18 The Court has already ruled on whether Plaintiffs’ injuries are  
19 fairly traceable to State actions performed pursuant to MEPA and the MEPA  
20 Limitation, and whether Plaintiffs’ injuries could be alleviated by an order  
21 declaring the MEPA Limitation unconstitutional. Order on MTD at 7-19. The  
22 State argues that discovery has resolved the factual disputes around causation and  
23 reiterates its position that Plaintiffs have failed to establish the “direct causal  
24 connection” articulated in *Larson v. State*, 2019 MT 28, ¶ 46, 434 P.3d 241, 262.  
25 The Court disagrees.

1           The State appears to be conflating the fairly traceable standard for  
2 standing with some kind of tort-like causation standard. As the Court already  
3 stated, “causation is an issue best left ‘to the rigors of evidentiary proof ...’”  
4 Order on MTD at 8-9 (quoting *Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.*,  
5 582 F.3d 309, 345-47 (2d Cir. 2009), *rev’d on non-material grounds by Am. Elec.*  
6 *Power Co. v. Connecticut*, 564 U.S. 410, 411, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2011) (US  
7 Supreme Court affirmed Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction; reversed on  
8 displacement)). Furthermore, “the ‘fairly traceable’ standard is not equivalent to  
9 a requirement of tort causation.” *Connecticut*, 582 F.3d at 346 (citing *Natural*  
10 *Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins*, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992) (“for  
11 purposes of satisfying Article III's causation requirement, we are concerned with  
12 something less than the concept of proximate cause” (citation and internal  
13 quotation marks omitted)); *Barbour v. Haley*, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir.  
14 2006)).

15           In its briefing, the State quotes the “direct causal connection”  
16 language from *Larson* but omits how it was prefaced: “a general or abstract  
17 interest in the constitutionality of a statute or the legality of government action is  
18 insufficient for standing *absent* a direct causal connection” between the alleged  
19 illegality and the injury. *Larson* ¶ 46 (emphasis added). A plain reading suggests  
20 a “direct causal connection” is only required when plaintiffs have “a general or  
21 abstract interest” in the controversy, but that would violate the standing rules for  
22 concrete and particularized injury. Furthermore, *Larson* did not involve the  
23 constitutionality of statutes. It is unclear how this Court should interpret and  
24 apply this phrase from *Larson* to this case.

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1           This “direct causal connection” language has only been used to  
2 describe standing in *Larson* itself. *Id.* To learn where that language came from,  
3 the Court performed a Lexis search for “direct causal connection” and found this  
4 language in thirteen other Montana cases: eleven workers’ compensation cases  
5 and two negligence cases. In all those other cases, the courts were describing tort  
6 causation, not standing. *See e.g., Andree v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.*,  
7 47 Mont. 554, 568, 133 P. 1090 (1913); *Landeen v. Toole Cnty. Ref. Co.*,  
8 85 Mont. 41, 54, 277 P. 615 (1929); *Birdwell v. Three Forks Portland Cement*  
9 *Co.*, 98 Mont. 483, 497, 40 P.2d 43 (1935); *Young v. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co.*,  
10 138 Mont. 458, 463, 357 P.2d 886 (1960); *Hines v. Indus. Accident Bd.*,  
11 138 Mont. 588, 601, 358 P.2d 447 (1960) (Castles dissenting); *Greger v. United*  
12 *Prestress*, 180 Mont. 348, 352, 590 P.2d 1121 (1979); *Ridenour v. Equity Supply*  
13 *Co.*, 204 Mont. 473, 477, 665 P.2d 783 (1983); *Whittington v. Ramsey Constr. &*  
14 *Fabrication*, 229 Mont. 115, 122, 744 P.2d 1251 (1987); *Polk v. Planet Ins. Co.*,  
15 287 Mont. 79, 83, 951 P.2d 1015 (1997); *Hanks v. Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp.*,  
16 2002 MT 334, ¶ 33, 62 P.3d 710 (Trieweiler dissenting); *Stavenjord v. Mont.*  
17 *State Fund*, 2003 MT 67, ¶ 57, 67 P.3d 229 (Rice dissenting); *Pittman v. Horton*,  
18 2004 ML 1654, 18, 2004 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1771, \*14; *Kratovil v. Liberty Nw.*  
19 *Ins. Corp.*, 2008 MT 443, ¶ 19, 200 P.3d 71.

20           Furthermore, federal courts have held bench trials “where the  
21 plaintiffs’ standing allegations were put to the proof based on the facts elicited,”  
22 and even in that context, “courts have pointed out that ‘tort-like causation is not  
23 required by Article III.’” *Connecticut* at 346 (citing *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.*  
24 *Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.*, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000); *Sierra Club, Lone*  
25 *Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co.*, 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996); *Nat. Res. Def.*

1 *Council v. Watkins*, 954 F.2d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 1992); *Pub. Interest Research*  
2 *Grp. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals*, 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A plaintiff  
3 need not prove causation with absolute scientific rigor to defeat a motion for  
4 summary judgment”). And Montana courts have recognized, even in tort law,  
5 that causation is a factual issue to be *proven* at trial, not summary judgment.  
6 *Prindel v. Ravalli Cnty.*, 2006 MT 62, ¶ 46, 133 P.3d 165 (“[C]ausation should  
7 not be decided on summary judgment, but should be resolved by the trier of  
8 fact”).

9           The State also argues that MEPA “requires a reasonably close  
10 causal relationship between the triggering state action and the subject  
11 environmental effect,” and that “an agency action is a legal cause of an  
12 environmental effect only if the agency can prevent the effect through the lawful  
13 exercise” of its authority. Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. MSJ at 6 (quoting *Bitterrooters*  
14 *for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Env’tl. Quality*, 2017 MT 222, ¶ 33,  
15 401 P.3d 712). “Thus,” the State says, “because Defendants have no independent  
16 statutory authority to regulate or prevent climate change or its environmental  
17 impacts, any exclusion from environmental review of climate change or its  
18 impacts pursuant to the MEPA Limitation cannot be considered a legal cause of  
19 Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries.” *Id.* at 6-7.

20           Based on the pleadings and discovery, there appears to be a  
21 reasonably close causal relationship between the State’s permitting of fossil fuel  
22 activities under MEPA, GHG emissions, climate change, and Plaintiffs’ alleged  
23 injuries. Furthermore, the State has the authority to regulate GHG emissions and  
24 climate impacts by regulating fossil fuel activities that occur in Montana.  
25 Throughout this litigation, the State has pointed to the disparate statutes

1 governing specific activities such as the mining of coal, drilling oil and gas wells,  
2 and generating electricity from fossil fuels. *See e.g.*, Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 5-6,  
3 10. Those statutes clearly regulate fossil fuel activities, and the State’s agents  
4 could alleviate the environmental effects of climate change through the lawful  
5 exercise of their authority if they were allowed to consider GHG emissions and  
6 climate impacts during MEPA review. It is a tautology to suggest that Plaintiffs  
7 cannot challenge the statute depriving the agencies of authority because the  
8 agencies lack that very authority. The State may not have the power to regulate  
9 out-of-state actors that burn Montana coal, but it could consider the effects of  
10 burning that coal before permitting a new coal mine. This Court cannot force the  
11 State to conduct that analysis, but it can strike down a statute prohibiting it.

12 As discussed in the Order on Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs only  
13 need to show their injuries will be effectively alleviated, remedied, or prevented  
14 by a favorable ruling. Order on MTD at 15:17-16:3 (citing *Larson v. State*,  
15 2019 MT 28, ¶¶ 46, 394 Mont. 167, 434 P.3d 241). The Court ruled that Plaintiffs  
16 had established redressability. *Id.* at 18:23.

17 In addition to the specific facts alleged and supported with data in  
18 the Complaint, Compl. ¶¶ 118, 122-141, 144-184, Plaintiffs have set forth  
19 specific facts by declaration and deposition that establish both causation and  
20 redressability, i.e.; Montana’s contributions to GHG emissions can be measured  
21 incrementally, Dorrington 30(b)(6) Dep. 38:3-12; Montana’s contributions are  
22 not *de minimis*, Erickson Expert Report at 19-20; Erickson Dep. 38:6-7.

23 The State disputes Plaintiffs’ specific facts, and factual disputes are  
24 not appropriate for disposition at summary judgment. The Court will find facts  
25 after trial. Here and now, the State has not shown that there are no genuine issues  
of material fact. Notwithstanding the State’s failure to meet its own burden,

1 Plaintiffs have sufficiently supported their allegations with specific facts to  
2 survive summary judgment.

### 3 **II. Prudential Standing**

4 Viewing the MEPA Limitation separately from the *de facto* energy  
5 policy, Plaintiffs’ reading of *Donaldson* is correct. Pls.’ Br. Opp. MSJ at 12  
6 (“Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to enact new laws”) (citing *Donaldson* ¶ 4).  
7 Here, like in *Donaldson*, Plaintiffs asked for remedies that went beyond the scope  
8 of the Court’s power and the Court has dismissed those claims. *See supra* pp. 3-  
9 4; Order on MTD at 21:4-20. However, unlike *Donaldson*, this case now only  
10 involves declaring a statute unconstitutional. As the State concedes, declaring the  
11 MEPA Limitation unconstitutional is not congruent with commanding the State  
12 to consider climate change in every project or proposal. Defs.’ MSJ at 8 (“The  
13 Montana Legislature would have to amend MEPA to require this analysis”).  
14 There are no prudential concerns that prevent this Court from adjudging whether  
15 the MEPA Limitation is constitutional.

### 16 **III. Absurd Results**

17 “The absurd results canon . . . is a rule of statutory construction  
18 that serves to help resolve . . . ambiguity pursuant to which courts should  
19 construe statutes so as to avoid results glaringly absurd.” *NRDC v. United States*  
20 *DOI*, 478 F. Supp. 3d 469, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting *United States v.*  
21 *Venturella*, 391 F.3d 120, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks  
22 removed).

23 The State argues that it “strains the bounds of credulity to assume  
24 that the Framers of the Montana Constitution had any intention of the right to a  
25 clean and healthful environment to be construed so broadly,” Defs.’ Br. Supp.

1 MSJ at 13. The Court interprets this argument as a rebuttal to Plaintiffs’  
2 allegations that a clean and healthful environment includes “a stable climate  
3 system that sustains human lives and liberties.” Compl. at 103 (Prayer for Relief  
4 4). The State speculates that an adverse ruling in this case will “give rise to  
5 seemingly endless litigation against all manner of public and private entities and  
6 individuals for any given emission of GHGs—from electrical generation to  
7 driving a car or using wood-burning stoves.” Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 13.

8           While the State correctly points out that Convention delegates  
9 never explicitly discussed a “stable climate system” during the debates over the  
10 environmental provisions, Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 13, the Montana Supreme  
11 Court has recognized that “it was agreed by both sides of the debate that it was  
12 the convention’s intention to adopt whatever the convention could agree was the  
13 stronger language.” *MEIC I* ¶ 75 (citing Convention Transcripts, Vol IV at 1209,  
14 March 1, 1972). In fact, the Court has repeatedly found that the Framers intended  
15 the state constitution contain “the strongest environmental protection provision  
16 found in any state constitution.” *Park Cnty. Env’tl. Council v. Mont. Dep’t of*  
17 *Env’tl. Quality*, 2020 MT 303, ¶ 61, 402 Mont. 168, 477 P.3d 288 (quoting *MEIC*  
18 *I* ¶ 66).

19           Furthermore, the obligations of the Legislature found in Art. IX,  
20 Sec. 1 include providing “adequate remedies for the protection of the  
21 environmental life-support system from degradation.” Mont. Const. Art. IX,  
22 Sec. 1. The Court in *MEIC I* cited Delegate McNeil’s comments for guidance as  
23 to what that meant: “the term ‘environmental life support system’ is all-  
24 encompassing, including but not limited to air, water, and land; and whatever  
25 interpretation is afforded this phrase by the Legislature and courts, there is no

1 question that it cannot be degraded.” *MEIC I* ¶ 67 (citing Convention Transcripts,  
2 Vol. IV at 1201, March 1, 1972) (emphasis in opinion). “[O]ur intention was to  
3 permit no degradation from the present environment and affirmatively require  
4 enhancement of what we have now.” *Id.* ¶ 69 (quoting Convention Transcripts,  
5 Vol IV at 1205, March 1, 1972) (emphasis in opinion).

6           Accordingly, the *MEIC I* Court concluded that the Montana  
7 Constitution’s environmental provisions were “both anticipatory and  
8 preventative,” and that “the delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that  
9 degree of environmental degradation which can be conclusively linked to ill  
10 health or physical endangerment.” *MEIC I* ¶¶ 76-77. Delegate Foster’s comment  
11 is apposite again: “[I]f we put in the Constitution that the only line of defense is a  
12 healthful environment and that I have to show, in fact, that my health is being  
13 damaged in order to find some relief, then we’ve lost the battle.” *MEIC I* ¶ 74  
14 (citing Convention Transcripts, Vol. V at 1243-44, March 1, 1972). These  
15 conclusions sound in both this absurdity analysis and the standing analysis  
16 previously discussed.

17           The Court reaffirmed the conclusions of *MEIC I* in *Park Cnty*,  
18 which warrants quoting at length:

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1           “Our conclusions in *MEIC I* are consistent with the constitutional  
2 text's unambiguous reliance on preventative measures to ensure that  
3 Montanans' inalienable right to a ‘clean and healthful environment’  
4 is as evident in the air, water, and soil of Montana as in its law  
5 books. Article IX, Section 1, of the Montana Constitution describes  
6 the environmental rights of ‘future generations,’ while requiring  
7 ‘protection’ of the environmental life support system ‘from  
8 degradation’ and ‘prevent[ion of] unreasonable depletion and  
9 degradation’ of the state's natural resources. This forward-looking  
10 and preventative language clearly indicates that Montanans have a  
11 right not only to reactive measures after a constitutionally-proscribed  
12 environmental harm has occurred, but to be free of its occurrence in  
13 the first place.

14           Montanans' right to a clean and healthful environment is  
15 complemented by an affirmative duty upon their government to take  
16 active steps to realize this right. Article IX, Section 1, Subsections 1  
17 and 2, of the Montana Constitution command that the Legislature  
18 ‘shall provide for the administration and enforcement’ of measures  
19 to meet the State's obligation to ‘maintain and improve’ the  
20 environment. Critically, Subsection 3 explicitly directs the  
21 Legislature to ‘provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable  
22 depletion and degradation of natural resources.’ Mont. Const. art. IX,  
23 § 1(3).”

24 *Park Cnty.* ¶¶ 62-63.

25           Based on the plain language of the implicated constitutional  
provisions, the intent of the Framers, and Montana Supreme Court precedent, it  
would not be absurd to find that a stable climate system is included in the “clean  
and healthful environment” and “environmental life-support system”  
contemplated by the Framers. Mont. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3; Art. IX, Sec. 1.

          There is also no evidence, besides the State’s speculative and  
conclusory statements, that such a judgment would result in an opening of the

1 floodgates. The Southern District of New York recently dealt with a similar  
2 argument from the Department of the Interior regarding incidental take of  
3 migratory birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), finding that  
4 “Interior’s complaint that without the Jorjani Opinion the MBTA raises the  
5 specter of criminal liability any time someone allows his or her cat to go outside  
6 falls flat.” *NRDC*, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 487. The State’s argument that holding a  
7 clean and healthful environment to include a stable climate system would open  
8 the floodgates for private actions against Montanans for driving cars or using  
9 wood stoves similarly “falls flat.” *Id.*

#### 10 **IV. Indispensable Parties**

11 Next, the State argues that Plaintiffs failed to join indispensable  
12 parties. The only bases proffered in support of this argument are the speculative  
13 statements that “the declaratory relief Plaintiffs seek could and would result in  
14 the reduction of GHG emissions *through the destruction of Montana’s fossil fuel*  
15 *industry* and the injunction of related activities,” and that “Plaintiffs would surely  
16 reverse and prohibit the permitting of all manner of fossil-fuel related activities  
17 on a unilateral basis *if they had their druthers.*” Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 13-14  
18 (emphasis added). The first statement essentially concedes that declaratory relief  
19 would redress Plaintiffs’ injuries, contrary to the State’s redressability arguments.  
20 The second demonstrates that this argument relies on speculative hyperbole.

21 As discussed above, declaring the MEPA Limitation  
22 unconstitutional is not commanding the State to consider climate change in every  
23 project or proposal. Furthermore, vacatur of specific permits is not an available  
24 remedy in this case. There are no indispensable parties unnamed in this suit.

25 /////

1       **V.       Constitutionality**

2               “The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, ‘unless it conflicts  
3 with the constitution, in the judgment of the court, beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  
4 *Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State*, 2016 MT 44, ¶ 12, 382 Mont. 256,  
5 368 P.3d 1131 (quoting *Powell v. State Comp. Fund.*, 2000 MT 321, ¶ 13,  
6 302 Mont. 518, 15 P.3d 877). The party challenging the constitutionality of a  
7 statute bears the burden of proof. *Id.* (citing *Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dep't*  
8 *of Labor and Indus.*, 2012 MT 320, ¶ 16, 368 Mont. 66, 291 P.3d 1231). To  
9 prevail on their facial challenges, Plaintiffs must show “that ‘no set of  
10 circumstances exists under which the [challenged statute] would be valid, i.e.,  
11 that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications’ or that the statute lacks  
12 any ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” *State v. Jensen*, 2020 MT 309, ¶ 12,  
13 402 Mont. 231, 477 P.3d 335) (quoting *Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State*  
14 *Republican Party*, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).

15               However, “the distinction” between facial and as-applied  
16 challenges “is perhaps overstated.” *Park Cnty.* ¶ 85. “Courts seek to resolve the  
17 controversy at hand, not to speculate about the constitutionality of hypothetical  
18 fact patterns.” *Id.* ¶ 86. As the Montana Supreme Court has previously held for  
19 other MEPA amendments: “the 2011 Amendments [to MEPA] are  
20 unconstitutional because they substantially burden a fundamental right and are  
21 not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Thus, our  
22 conclusion that [the statutes are] unconstitutional flows from the content of the  
23 statute itself, not the particular circumstances of the litigants.” *Id.* The Court’s  
24 reasoning in *Park Cnty.* is compelling.

25       /////

1           **a.       Balancing competing constitutional rights and interests is the**  
2 **Court’s duty.**

3           The State cites *Berman*, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) for the  
4 proposition that it “is solely the Legislature’s prerogative” to balance competing  
5 constitutional rights and interests. Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 15. The State argues  
6 that “[i]t is not for Plaintiffs *or the judiciary* to strike a proper balance between  
7 Montanan’s right to a clean and healthful environment” and other rights. *Id.*  
8 (emphasis added).

9           *Berman* involved a challenge to Congress’ exercise of police  
10 powers in Washington D.C.—a condemnation of property pursuant to the District  
11 of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. *Id.* at 31. The Supreme Court held that  
12 great judicial deference is given to a legislative determination that a use is a  
13 public use. *Id.* at 31-32. The language the State is ostensibly referencing states:  
14 “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken,  
15 the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases  
16 the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be  
17 served by social legislation...” *Berman* at 32. *Berman* does not present the  
18 factual or legal issues presented here, and it does not hold that the legislature is  
19 generally the arbiter of constitutional rights. *Compare, e.g., Missoulian v. Bd. of*  
20 *Regents*, 207 Mont. 513, 529, 675 P.2d 962 (1984) (Court required to “balance  
21 the competing constitutional interests in the context of the facts of each case”);  
22 *Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis*, 219 Mont. 426, 433-34 712 P.2d 1309 (1986) (Court  
23 developed the “meaningful middle-tier” scrutiny which includes a balancing of  
24 interests test); *Crites v. Lewis & Clark Cnty.*, 2019 MT 161, ¶ 27, 396 Mont. 336,  
25 444 P.3d 1025 (quoting *In re Lacy*, 239 Mont. 321, 326, 780 P.2d 186 (1989)).

1 (“Because the judiciary has authority over the interpretation of the Constitution,  
2 it is the courts' duty to balance the competing rights at issue”). It is the judiciary’s  
3 duty to determine a statute’s constitutionality and balance competing  
4 constitutional rights and interests.

5 **b. The MEPA Limitation**

6 When interpreting a statute, the courts “look first to the plain  
7 meaning of the words [the statute] contains.” *State v. Kelm*, 2013 MT 115, ¶ 22,  
8 300 P.3d 387 (quoting *Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC*, 2012 MT 321, ¶ 55,  
9 293 P.3d 817). Courts must endeavor to give “harmonious effect” to its various  
10 provisions, *Crist v. Segna*, 191 Mont. 210, 213, 622 P.2d 1028 (1981), and may  
11 not construe a statute in a manner that would “defeat its evident object or  
12 purpose.” *Howell v. State*, 263 Mont. 275, 286-87, 868 P.2d 568 (1994).

13 “The essential purpose of MEPA is to aid in the agency decision-  
14 making process otherwise provided by law by informing the agency and the  
15 interested public of environmental impacts that will likely result from agency  
16 actions or decisions.” *Bitterrooters*, 2017 MT 222, ¶ 18. “MEPA is an essential  
17 aspect of the State's efforts to meet its constitutional obligations.” *Park Cnty.*  
18 ¶ 89.

19 The MEPA Limitation provided:

20 (2)(a) Except as provided in subsection (2)(b), an environmental  
21 review conducted pursuant to subsection (1) may not include a  
22 review of actual or potential impacts beyond Montana's borders. It  
23 may not include actual or potential impacts that are regional,  
24 national, or global in nature.

24 (b) An environmental review conducted pursuant to subsection (1)  
25 may include a review of actual or potential impacts beyond  
Montana's borders if it is conducted by:

- 1 (i) the department of fish, wildlife, and parks for the management of  
2 wildlife and fish;  
3 (ii) an agency reviewing an application for a project that is not a  
4 state-sponsored project to the extent that the review is required by  
5 law, rule, or regulation; or  
6 (iii) a state agency and a federal agency to the extent the review is  
7 required by the federal agency.

8 Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-201(2) (Amended by HB 971 on May 10, 2023).

9 While this case has been pending, Judge Moses' held in *MEIC v.*  
10 *DEQ*:

11 Here, the plain language of MCA 75-1-201(2)(a) precludes agency  
12 MEPA review of environmental impacts that are 'beyond Montana's  
13 borders,' but it does not absolve DEQ of its MEPA obligation to  
14 evaluate a project's environmental impacts within Montana. DEQ  
15 misinterprets the statute. They must take a hard look at the  
16 greenhouse gas effects of this project as it relates to the impacts  
17 within the Montana borders.

18 *MEIC v. DEQ*, DV-56-2021-0001307 (13<sup>th</sup> District, April 6, 2023) (Order on  
19 Summary Judgment) at 29:3-9.

20 The substance of HB 971 had been requested on December 3,  
21 2022, but the draft was not provided until April 11, 2023. The bill was introduced  
22 on April 14, 2023, eight days after Judge Moses' ruling. The bill was sent to  
23 enrolling on May 1 and signed by the Governor on May 10. It is a bill to clarify  
24 the statute and amends Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(2) to say:

25 /////

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/////

1           “(2)(a) Except as provided in subsection (2)(b), an environmental  
2 review conducted pursuant to subsection (1) may not include an  
3 evaluation of greenhouse gas emissions and corresponding impacts  
4 to the climate in the state or beyond the state’s borders.

5           (b) An environmental review conducted pursuant to subsection (1)  
6 may include an evaluation if:

7           (i) conducted jointly by a state agency and a federal agency to the  
8 extent the review is required by the federal agency; or

9           (ii) the United States congress amends the federal Clean Air Act to  
10 include carbon dioxide emissions as a regulated pollutant.”

11 Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(2) (enacted May 10, 2023) (new language  
12 underlined).

13           Throughout this litigation, the parties and the Court have used  
14 varying terminology to describe this statute: exclusion, exception, limitation, etc.  
15 This statute is aptly described as the MEPA Limitation because it categorically  
16 limits what the agencies, officials, and employees tasked with protecting  
17 Montana’s environment can consider—it hamstrings them. On its face, the  
18 MEPA Limitation appears to conflict with the purpose of MEPA, which is to aid  
19 the State in meeting its constitutional obligation to prevent degradation by  
20 “informing the agency and the interested public of environmental impacts that  
21 will likely result” from State actions. *Bitterrooters* ¶ 18.

22           The State argues that since not all State actions taken pursuant to  
23 MEPA would implicate effects beyond Montana’s borders, the statute is patently  
24 constitutional because Plaintiffs failed to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that  
25 ‘no set of circumstances exist under which the [challenged sections] would be  
valid.” Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 14 (quoting *Mont. Cannabis* ¶ 14; *Satterlee* ¶ 10).  
The State conveniently omits the second half of that rule, which states: “or that  
the statute lacks any ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” *State v. Jensen*, 2020 MT 309,

1 ¶ 12, 402 Mont. 231, 477 P.3d 335 (emphasis added) (quoting *Wash. State*  
2 *Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party*, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).

3 Plaintiffs need not prove the unconstitutionality of the statute on  
4 summary judgment, and the State’s attempt to cherry-pick situations when the  
5 MEPA Limitation has no real bearing on the decision-making process is  
6 unavailing. The MEPA Limitation bars the agencies from considering GHG  
7 emissions and climate impacts for any project or proposal, unless compelled by  
8 Federal law, whether the project would lead to any of those effects or not. But  
9 even if an analysis of GHGs and climate impacts is unnecessary given the nature  
10 and scope of a particular project, the statute still imposes a blanket prohibition.  
11 The Montana Supreme Court dealt with this argument in *Park Cnty.* and  
12 approvingly quoted Justice Leaphart’s concurrence in *MEIC I*:

13 “The fact that there may be water discharges from well tests, say for  
14 agricultural purposes, that do not in fact create harm to the  
15 environment, does not alter the fact that such discharges are  
16 exempted from nondegradation review and that such review is the  
17 tool by which the State implements and enforces the constitutional  
right to a clean and healthy environment.”

18 *Park Cnty.* ¶ 87 (quoting *MEIC I*, ¶ 85 (Leaphart, J., specially concurring)). The  
19 Court found “Justice Leaphart’s reasoning persuasive and adopt[ed] it” in that  
20 case. *Id.* ¶ 88.

21 Similarly, the fact there may be projects that do not implicate  
22 GHGs and climate impacts does not alter the fact that the statute prohibits  
23 considering those factors. The State vigorously contends that MEPA is  
24 procedural, and the Court agrees, but “[p]rocedural, of course, does not mean  
25 unimportant.” *Park Cnty.* ¶ 70 (internal quotation marks omitted). The MEPA



1 Limitation affects MEPA procedure the same way every time—it blocks an entire  
2 line of inquiry.

3           Next, the State argues that it is entitled to summary judgment  
4 because Plaintiffs have failed to establish the unconstitutionality of the  
5 exceptions to the MEPA Limitation. Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 16. The State does  
6 not offer any legal authority supporting this proposition, and the Court rejects it.  
7 The *exceptions* to an allegedly unconstitutional statute could be constitutional.  
8 But that does not change the fundamental analysis of the statute itself. *See Park*  
9 *Cnty.* ¶ 86. Two narrow exceptions, exceptions that merely allow the agencies to  
10 conduct the analysis Plaintiffs want them to do, and only when required by  
11 Federal law, cannot shield the statute’s main text from constitutional review. *Id.*  
12 The intent of the Framers was not to lag behind the Federal government in  
13 environmental protections, it was to have the strongest constitutional  
14 environmental protections in the country. *Park Cnty.* ¶ 61; *MEIC I* ¶¶ 66, 74-75.  
15 If anything, these exceptions inform the tailoring analysis under strict scrutiny,  
16 but the case has not yet proceeded to that stage.

17           The MEPA Limitation clearly implicates Plaintiffs’ fundamental  
18 right to a clean and healthful environment. A statute may only infringe a  
19 fundamental right if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  
20 *Park Cnty.* ¶¶ 84-86. Whether Plaintiffs can prove standing and whether the  
21 statute can withstand strict scrutiny will be determined after trial.

## 22 **VI. Plaintiffs’ other claims.**

23           The State also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ equal  
24 protection claim, arguing that the MEPA Limitation does not create  
25 classifications. Defs.’ Br. Supp. MSJ at 18. However, Plaintiffs correctly point

1 out that “the law may contain no classification . . . and be applied evenhandedly,”  
2 but still “may be challenged as in reality constituting a device designed to impose  
3 different burdens on different classes of persons.” Pls.’ Br. Opp. MSJ at 20  
4 (quoting *Gazelka v. St. Peter’s Hosp.*, 2018 MT 152, ¶ 16, 420 P.3d 528).  
5 Whether climate change and the MEPA Limitation impact youths  
6 disproportionately is a material fact to be proven at trial.

7 Plaintiffs also levied claims under the right to seek safety, health  
8 and happiness, Mont. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3, 15, 17, Art. IX, Sec. 1; and the public  
9 trust doctrine, Mont. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 1, 3. Compl. Counts II, III, IV. The  
10 State argues on Reply that “all of Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to dismissal [not  
11 summary judgment] under Defendants’ arguments regarding standing, prudential  
12 concerns, absurd results, failure to join indispensable parties, and failure to  
13 demonstrate the facial invalidity” of the challenged statutes, and that none of  
14 these claims “survive summary judgment if Defendants prevail on any one of  
15 these arguments.” Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. MSJ at 18. As discussed above, the  
16 State did not prevail on those arguments. Also, the State did not establish any  
17 undisputed facts that entitle it to summary judgment on those claims.

18 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is  
19 **DENIED.**

20  
21 **ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED BELOW**

22  
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24 Barbara Chillcott, via email: chillcott@westernlaw.org  
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